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The steep drop in the U.S. personal saving rate over the last decade has fueled speculation
that Americans are spending recklessly. But alternative measures of personal saving show that
households are actually setting aside a larger share of their resources than the official figures
suggest. In addition, government saving has risen markedly, leading to an increase in overall
domestic saving that has helped finance a surge in U.S. investment.
The U.S. personal saving rate has fallen dramatically
since the early 1990s. It surpassed earlier record lows in
1999 and, on occasion this year, even dipped below zero
(Chart 1).The decline has prompted fears that house-
holds have become financially overextended—a condi-
tion that could slow or reverse the recent strong growth
of consumer spending. Adding to the concern is the
belief, voiced by many observers, that overall saving and
capital formation in the United States are inadequate.
In this edition of Current Issues, we argue that these
fears are not well founded. The low reported personal sav-
ing rate provides a very distorted measure of the state of
household finances and the ability of consumers to con-
tinue spending. Alternative measures of personal saving
remain firmly in positive territory and, in some cases,
have not declined at all in recent years. In addition, the
decline in the personal saving rate has obscured more
favorable trends in saving by the economy as a whole.
National saving has been rising as a share of GDP since
the early 1990s. This increase, along with foreign capital
inflows, has helped to fund a pronounced increase in the
rate of growth of the nation’s capital stock.
Problems with the Personal Saving Measure
The Bureau of Economic Analysis produces the stan-
dard measure of personal saving as part of its National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).1 The saving
measure is derived from the NIPA measure of dispos-
able personal income, which is defined as personal
income after the payment of payroll and income taxes.
Personal saving is calculated as disposable personal
income less personal outlays, while the personal saving
rate is computed as the ratio of personal saving to dis-
posable personal income (expressed as a percentage).
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Chart 1 
Personal Saving Rate
National Income and Product  Accounts Measure
Percent
1983-92 average: 8.4%
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.In recent years, the saving rate has declined because
growth in disposable income has not kept pace with
growth in consumer outlays. Yet there is good reason to
believe that measured disposable income may in fact
understate the true resources of U.S. households. If so,
then the reported rate of personal saving may also
understate what households are actually putting away.2
What evidence do we have for saying that the income
measure understates household resources? To begin
with, the National Income and Product Accounts are
designed to measure the goods, services, and structures
produced in the current period and the incomes earned
in the course of that production. Because “production,
or ‘current production,’ and its related incomes do not
include gains or losses from the sale of nonproduced
assets, such as land, or of financial assets, such as
stocks and bonds” (U.S. Department of Commerce
1998, p. M-1), capital gains are not counted as part of
NIPA personal income. Yet certainly one can argue that
capital gains—either realized or unrealized—are an
important form of household income. By excluding
capital gains, the NIPA calculations may very well
underestimate the real state of household income and,
consequently, saving.
Aggravating this conceptual problem is the NIPA
treatment of capital gains taxes. Like most other forms
of taxes, those paid on realized capital gains are sub-
tracted from personal income to derive an estimate of
disposable income.3 However, it is quite likely that
households draw the funds they need to pay capital
gains taxes from the gains themselves, rather than from
wages or other forms of current income. If the payment
of capital gains taxes does not materially affect the abil-
ity of households to save out of other types of income,
then the practice of subtracting such taxes may con-
tribute to misleadingly low estimates of disposable
income and saving. Indeed, this practice may help to
explain the timing of the decline in the personal saving
rate, since capital gains taxes have increased rapidly in
recent years.
Finally, the behavior of “other labor income” over
the past several years may have contributed to holding
down the personal income and saving numbers. This
component of the NIPA income measure consists of all
employer payments for fringe benefits, including
employer contributions to defined-benefit pension
plans. These contributions have leveled off in recent
years, after a long period of rapid growth. The slow-
down stems in part from the rise in the stock market,
which has raised the value of the assets held by such
plans and thereby lessened the need for employer con-
tributions. The decline in these contributions has
depressed reported personal income and saving, but
clearly has not affected the resources or cash flow of
any retiree or worker enrolled in these plans—current
benefits are being paid and the rise in the stock market
helps to secure promised future benefits.4
Alternative Saving Measures
There are several possible ways to correct the personal
saving rate for the misleading trends arising from the
treatment of capital gains and capital gains taxes.5 One
is to increase disposable income and saving by remov-
ing taxes paid on capital gains from the personal tax
data (Chart 2, dashed line).6 While this change still
results in a declining saving rate over the past six years,
the recent level of the personal saving rate would be
increased about 1½ percentage points. Another way to
correct the reported saving rate is to keep capital gains
taxes in the tax series but add capital gains realizations
to personal income (Chart 2, dotted line).7 In that case,
the personal saving rate in 1999 would have been about
7¼ percentage points higher than officially reported
and would have declined very little in the 1990s.
These adjustments suggest that the true flow of
resources available to the household sector is larger than
the official NIPA income and saving measures suggest.
An even larger upward adjustment would occur if all
capital gains, realized and unrealized, were included in
disposable income (Chart 3). In effect, this adjustment
redefines saving as the change in household wealth,
since, by definition, all increases in wealth arise from
either saving or capital gains. By this measure, the sav-
ing rate has risen markedly in recent years. It is not nec-
essary, however, to include in saving all increments to
household wealth to suggest that the reported decline in
the personal saving rate gives a deceptive impression of
consumer behavior. As we have seen, simply including
realized capital gains in income reverses the downward
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Chart 2 
Adjusted Personal Saving Rate 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office; authors’ calculations.
Percenttrend.8Thus, we have reasonable grounds for concluding
that the growth of household spending has not out-
stripped the flow of resources to the household sector.
Trends in Gross National Saving, Gross Investment,
and Capital Formation
Households are not the only savers in the U.S. economy.
To obtain a complete picture of national saving, we
need to add business and government saving to that of
households. While the NIPA measure of personal saving
has been trending lower, gross saving and gross invest-
ment—measured as a percentage of current-dollar
GNP9—have been increasing (Chart 4, top panel). To be
sure, the investment share of current-dollar GNP still
falls short of some earlier peaks. But the effect of the
recent increase in investment has been magnified by
declines in capital goods prices, and the result has been
a significant strengthening in the rate of growth of the
real private capital stock since 1995 (Chart 4, bottom
panel). Net inflows of foreign capital, which are also
used to finance internal investment in the United States,
have increased over the period as well, reaching 4.0 per-
cent of GNP in the first quarter of 2000.10 But the rise
of domestic saving alone would have been sufficient to
fund a significant increase in domestic investment.
The upturn in gross saving stems largely from the
sharp improvement in government finances. Government
saving rose from -2.8 percent of GNP in the third quarter
of 1992 to 5.1 percent in the second quarter of 2000,
more than offsetting the decline in the NIPA personal
saving measure.11 The improvement has been most pro-
nounced at the federal level but has occurred at the state
and local levels as well.
Of course, the strengthening in government finances
partly reflects increased payments of capital gains
taxes. In a consistent accounting system, correcting the
personal saving rate as we proposed earlier—that is, by
adding capital gains tax payments back into disposable
income—would lessen the improvement in government
saving because the capital gains tax revenue would be
“withdrawn” from the government sector. Nevertheless,
this reallocation would leave gross saving unaffected.
Are Households Overextended?
The decline in the personal saving rate has raised two
concerns. The first is that overall capital formation will
be restrained. It appears, however, that capital forma-
tion has proceeded at a quite vigorous pace during the
period in which personal saving dropped, helped by
increased saving from other sectors and large foreign
capital inflows. The second concern is that the decline
in personal saving is symptomatic of reckless behavior
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Chart 3 
Personal Saving Rate Including Realized 
and Unrealized Capital Gains
Percent
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Notes: The saving rate is calculated as the change in household net worth 
divided by adjusted income. Adjusted income is defined as disposable 
personal income  –  saving + change in net worth.
Chart 4 























00 96 92 88 84 80 76 72 68 64 1960
Real private nonresidential 
fixed capital stock
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
authors’ calculations.result in widespread financial distress and a collapse of
consumer spending. This view of consumer behavior is
a key aspect of the “bubble economy” explanation of
the sustained strong growth of the U.S. economy.
We have shown that redefining the personal saving
rate to include capital gains eliminates its downward
trend. However, we have not directly addressed the
issue of household behavior or potential financial dis-
tress. Since the overwhelming bulk of capital gains
accrue to a thin stratum of households, it is possible that
favorable developments for a few people are masking
troubling trends for the larger population.
To some observers, the unusual recent behavior of
aggregate financial flows is a sign that the private sec-
tor—which includes both households and nonfinancial
corporations—is exceeding its means and that house-
hold finances in particular are threatened.12 This line of
reasoning starts with the examination of the difference
between private saving and investment. Traditionally,
this difference has been positive. In other words, the
supply of funds to the capital market from U.S. house-
holds has in general been more than adequate to meet
business financing needs, making the private sector as a
whole a net supplier of funds. However, this situation
has changed radically in recent years. At the end of
1999, the sum of household and nonfinancial corporate
capital expenditures exceeded private gross saving by
about 3 percent of GNP, a very large imbalance by the
standards of the past forty years. The funds used to
close this gap stem ultimately from government sur-
pluses and foreign capital inflows.
The source of the shortfall in gross saving is evident
in Chart 5, which breaks out the private sector financial
balance into separate balances for households and non-
financial corporations. Most of the decline in the total
private financial balance has originated in the household
sector, which has now become, unprecedentedly, a net
demander of funds. The financial needs (or “financing
gap”) of the nonfinancial corporate sector have also
increased, but by no more than is customary during eco-
nomic expansions.
The decline in the household financial balance goes
hand in hand with the decline in the standard personal
saving rate measure. Households are indeed reducing
their net investment in financial assets, partly by
increased borrowing.13 This trend raises the question, Is
such a low rate of financial investment sustainable?
Fortunately, the aggregate data, when looked at in a
broader context, are reassuring. Although household
debt has grown relative to disposable income over the
past few years, it has shrunk relative to household
financial assets.14 A truly massive decline in the market
value of household assets would be required to bring the
ratio of aggregate debt to financial assets back up to
levels associated with the economic downturns of the
early 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, interest rates
since the early 1990s have in general been substantially
lower than in other recent decades. As a consequence,
the growth of debt service as a percentage of disposable
income has been fairly modest in recent years, and the
level of that ratio remains below levels reached in the
late 1980s. Finally, aggregate delinquency rates on con-
sumer installment loans have been declining since mid-
1997 and are substantially below levels reached in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.
Ideally, the state of household finances should be
determined by looking at data on individual households.
Unfortunately, we do not have detailed and up-to-date
information on the finances and spending patterns of
individual households. However, the aggregate data
provide some information suggesting that typical or
representative households—which probably have not
had massive capital gains in the stock market—are not
being particularly extravagant in their spending. One
form of income that has risen quite rapidly is wages and
salaries—an increase that is associated with the strong
growth in productivity over the past few years. Indeed,
from 1996 through the middle of 1999, growth of wage
and salary income exceeded growth of personal con-
sumption expenditures, often by a substantial margin
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Notes: Household financial balance = gross saving – capital expenditures. 
Gross saving = NIPA personal saving + net investment in consumer 
durables + consumption of fixed capital. Nonfinancial corporate financial 
balance = U.S. internal funds + inventory valuation adjustment – capital 
expenditures. U.S. internal funds = profits before tax – profit tax accruals 
– dividends + consumption of fixed capital. Total private financial 
balance = gross private saving – gross private domestic investment (NIPA).(Chart 6). This pattern seems inconsistent with the
notion of a spendthrift consumer, since wages and
salaries clearly make up the bulk of most households’
income (in the aggregate, wages and salaries represent
nearly two-thirds of total personal income). Overall, we
find it doubtful that the decline in the personal saving
rate stems from a new willingness to spend one’s wages
freely. Rather, the decline most likely reflects a reduced
propensity to save out of nonwage forms of income,
including dividends, rents, interest, and proprietors’
income. For many households, spending a larger por-
tion of these forms of income may be a way of tapping
the increased wealth they have accumulated from capi-
tal gains.
Conclusion
Many commentators have interpreted the decline in the
personal saving rate as evidence that consumers are liv-
ing beyond their means—a pattern that could eventually
precipitate a sharp cutback in consumer spending and
hurt overall economic growth. But a closer look at the
data suggests that the risk of such an outcome is exag-
gerated. The NIPA income data on which the saving rate
is based have substantially understated the true flow of
resources to the household sector. In addition, the
decline in the NIPA measure of personal saving has been
more than offset by increased government saving; overall
domestic saving flows have been on the upswing. This
increase in domestic saving, along with large foreign
capital inflows, has been the source of funding for the
surge in U.S. investment. Although households have
been borrowing substantially, household assets have
been rising even faster, while declining interest rates
through the end of 1998 have mitigated the increase in
debt burdens on household budgets. Finally, the notion
that ordinary consumers have been spending recklessly
is countered by the observation that in recent years
overall spending has been growing no more rapidly than
wages and salaries. Thus, the personal saving rate could
well remain quite low for some time without jeopardiz-
ing household spending or finances.
Notes
1. See Seskin and Parker (1998) for a general overview of the
National Income and Product Accounts.
2. The Bureau of Economic Analysis has itself acknowledged that
“the NIPA definitions of income and saving are not the only reason-
able definitions” (Larkins 1999, p. 9).
3. Estate and gift tax payments are not subtracted from personal
income in the NIPA. Federal individual income taxes have been ris-
ing more rapidly than personal income in recent years. From fiscal
year (FY) 1994 to FY1999, federal individual income taxes
increased at a very rapid compound annual rate of 10.1 percent.
Along with the rapid increase in capital gains taxes, this growth has
been fueled by a shift in the income distribution toward higher
income taxpayers. For more on these developments, see U.S.
Congressional Budget Office (2000).
4. For additional discussion of the conceptual issues surrounding
the NIPA personal saving rate, see Gale and Sabelhaus (1999). For
discussion of the factors behind the longer term decline of the per-
sonal saving rate, see Parker (2000).
5. It is difficult to correct the data for the softness in business con-
tributions for employee pension plans. One might like to restate the
income data by removing the business contributions from income
and adding back the pension payments themselves. However, in
principle one might also want the data to reflect the value of plan
enhancements to current workers. Such an adjustment would be dif-
ficult to make, but the current procedure of including business con-
tributions to the plans can be viewed as a means of acknowledging
such enhancements.
6. For 1997, 1998, and 1999, these taxes are estimated at $80 bil-
lion, $87 billion, and $100 billion, respectively. Data on capital
gains taxes for 1997 and 1998 are estimates provided by the
Congressional Budget Office. Data for 1999 are authors’estimates. 
7. Capital gains realizations are estimated at $365 billion in 1997,
$450 billion in 1998, and $510 billion in 1999 (see note 6, above,
for the sources of these estimates). These amounts are the sum of
capital gains reported on individual tax returns with positive capital
gains. They exclude capital gains realized within nontaxable
accounts such as IRAs, 401(k) plans, and life insurance policies, as
well as those realized by pension plans.
8. During the 1990s, taxable capital gains realizations were far less
than accrued gains. Corrado and Steindel (1980) and Harris and
Steindel (1991) discuss in more detail the connections between
household wealth accumulation, saving, and capital formation. 
9. GNP is GDP minus payments made to foreign owners of assets
employed in domestic production plus the return to U.S. residents on
their investments abroad. In the NIPA, the statistical discrepancy is a
balancing entry that makes the sum of total incomes equal the sum























99 97 95 93 91 89 87 85 1983
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
statistical discrepancy equals gross investment. For our purposes in
Chart 4 and related charts, we divide the statistical discrepancy
evenly between saving and investment. 
10. For an explanation of the relationship between the current
account balance and foreign capital inflows, see Higgins and
Klitgaard (1998).
11. Government saving is defined as the sum of the NIPA current
surplus and depreciation of the public capital stock, which in turn
equals the sum of the cash surplus less estate and gift taxes (see note 3
above) plus government capital spending. Of course, one might
argue that the personal saving rate has declined in part because
households believe that the increase in government saving is being
done on their behalf. For a review of the literature on this issue, see
Seater (1993). See Auerbach (2000) for a discussion of the recent
trends in federal government finances.
12. For example, see International Monetary Fund (1998) and
Godley (1999).
13. The seeming discrepancy between a net financial inflow to the
household sector and a positive, albeit low, saving rate is largely
explained by the categorization of housing purchases as investment,
not consumption, in the NIPA. Households are viewed as saving
when they acquire a home, although almost all need to borrow to
make the purchase.
14. The ratio of liabilities to assets for the aggregate household sec-
tor fell from .157 at the end of 1994 to .141 at the end of 1999
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2000,
Table B100, p. 97).
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